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THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS  Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2016) 
APPELLATE REMEDY: THE ANCIENT PRECEDENTS 
OF A MODERN RIGHT 
Peter S. Poland* 
Recourse to appeal, in both civil and criminal matters, is a 
fixture of our modern state and federal legal systems.1 While the 
American right of appeal does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional right, it is not a doctrinal abstraction. Rather, it is 
statutorily established,2 and referenced explicitly in the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 As most appellate judges are 
aware, litigants began exercising this right in increasing 
numbers in what could be termed an appellate explosion ignited 
in the early 1960s that lasted for decades.4 Because of the 
*Mr. Poland, who obtained his undergraduate degree in ancient history from Rice 
University, specializes in appeals and commercial litigation at The Ward Law Firm in The 
Woodlands, Texas. Prior to entering private practice, he was a staff attorney at the First 
Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas. Mr. Poland can be reached at poland@wardlaw.com. 
 1. See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) 
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 62 (1985) (characterizing right to at least one appeal as “nearly 
universal” in the United States). 
 2. An early reference to a right approaching the modern appeal appeared in the Evarts 
Act, 26 Stat. 826 (1891), which established the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Id. at § 4 
(providing that “all appeals by writ of error otherwise, from said district courts shall only 
be subject to review in the Supreme Court of the United States or in the circuit court of 
appeals hereby established”); see also Dalton, supra note 1, at 62 n.4 (citing McKane v. 
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), for the proposition that right to appeal is “statutory, . . . 
not constitutionally compelled”). 
 3. FED. R. APP. P. 3 (“Appeal as of Right—How Taken”); FED. R. APP. P. 4 (“Appeal 
as of Right—When Taken”).  
 4. E.g., Ben F. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 205, 205 (1984). But at least some courts began to experience a decrease in 
filings after the turn of the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics 2015, U.S. CTS. (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal- 
judicial-caseload-statistics-2015 (noting that in the year ended March 31, 2015, “filings 
declined 2.5 percent” in the federal courts of appeals); Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 
2014, U.S. CTS. (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics-2014 (noting that in the year ended March 31, 2014, “filings . . . fell 1.5 percent” 
in the federal courts of appeals); Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2013, U.S. CTS.
(2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2013 
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12 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
proliferation of appeals in the recent past, some perceive the 
appeal5 as a modern creation. But tradition holds, albeit vaguely, 
that the antecedents of our modern American appellate system 
lie in the ancient world.6 This essay begins with short summaries 
of ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean legal procedures that 
constitute or resemble appellate systems, and then briefly 
explores which of their components endure in modern American 
appellate procedure. 
I. ANCIENT APPELLATE PRECEDENT
A. Mesopotamia 
The most reliable evidence with which to reconstruct 
ancient Mesopotamian legal procedure dates to around the turn 
of the Second Millennium, B.C.E., when Sumer enjoyed a final 
resurgence before its rapid decline. Courts of this era rendered 
their final judgments on clay tablets of “no complaining,” and 
evidence suggests that unsuccessful plaintiffs were required to 
(noting that in the year ended March 31, 2013, filings in the federal courts of appeals fell 
by “less than 1 percent”); see also Judicial Caseload Indicators, U.S. CTS. (2013), http:/ 
/www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-caseload-indicators-federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics-2013 (noting that filings in the federal courts of appeals declined by 6.7 percent 
between 2004 and 2012); cf., e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining 
the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 102, 113–14 (2006) (pointing out 
that despite the “doomsday clamor” prevalent from the 1960s through the 1990s, “the 
courts of appeals [were] not hopelessly backlogged” in 2005, and were by then 
“manag[ing] to decide about as many appeals as [were] filed each year”). 
 5. “Appeal” as used throughout this essay refers to the modern definition of the term: 
“[a] proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher authority; 
esp[ecially], the submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher court for 
review and possible reversal.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th 
ed. 2014). This article does not address other definitions of appeal peculiar to past eras and 
unrelated to the modern term, such as the “appeal of felony” introduced to England after 
the Norman Conquest, which consisted of the victim’s oral accusation of serious crime. 
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 573 (3d ed. 1990) 
(indicating that this “appeal” might also be made by “approvers”—accomplices of the 
accused who could avoid punishment if they agreed to prosecute their fellows); HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 450 (1983) (explaining that “appeal” as used in 
medieval England “had no such connotations as it has today”). 
6. See, e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE 
FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 17 (1980) (observing that our modern appellate system can 
be traced, at least in part, to the ancient Near East).  
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ANCIENT PRECEDENTS OF THE MODERN RIGHT TO APPEAL 13
swear oaths not to litigate the same issue.7 However, if new 
evidence emerged, or if a material error occurred in the first 
trial, a litigant could bring a second proceeding in either the 
same court or a different horizontally situated court.8 There is no 
evidence of a vertical hierarchy of Mesopotamian courts, and 
litigants lacked the means to appeal to a higher authority.9
Despite this absence of vertical appeal, some experts have come 
to believe that at least some evidence suggests that “an appellate 
process of some kind was practiced” in ancient Mesopotamia 
based upon the availability to litigants, in certain circumstances, 
of the second proceeding.10
B. Egypt 
In its deeper past, Egypt’s judicial system resembled that of 
Mesopotamia: horizontal courts and the availability of a new 
trial if certain conditions—such as the discovery of new 
evidence—were met.11 But by the Twenty-second Dynasty 
(945–715 B.C.E.), Egypt employed an appellate system12 that 
included a right of appeal in both civil and minor criminal 
cases.13 Yet this appeal was not to a higher court of trained 
judges, but to the mystical jurisprudence of an oracle.14
Litigants likely approached the oracle with an even greater 
degree of solemnity and procedural formality than they would 
 7. RUSS VERSTEEG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW 58 (2000) (indicating that this 
“document of no (further) contest” showed “that the case was essentially res judicata”).
8. Id. (noting that “[i]n many cases . . . parties were not permitted any opportunity to a 
higher authority” (footnote omitted)).
 9. Id.
 10. Ronald Veenker & J. Cale Johnson, The Appellate Process in a Legal Record {di 
til-la} from Ur III Umma, 36 ALTORIENTAL. FORSCH. 349, 349 (2009) (discussing an 
inscription on a tablet in which “an initial legal ruling adjudicated some aspects of the slave 
sale in question, but other aspects such as the purchase price were appealled [sic] to the 
court of the provincial governor,” while also noting that scholars hesitate to “accept the 
existence of any formal process of appeal” or “a hierarchically organized system of 
appellate courts” in ancient Mesopotamia). 
 11. Aristide Theodorides, The Concept of Law in Ancient Egypt, in THE LEGACY OF 
EGYPT 291, 310 (J.R. Harris ed., 1971).
 12. RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT 89 (2002). 
13. Id.
14. Id. The oracle was not only an intermediate appellate forum, it also had original 
jurisdiction over real-property disputes, and was a frequent forum for identification of 
thieves. Id. at 59–60. 
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14 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
have brought to a court of justice; indeed, the ruling of the 
oracle was perceived as a literal epiphany.15 Litigants could 
petition for trial by oracle in either a written document or orally, 
and evidence suggests that the petitions were carefully and 
thoughtfully composed.16
The oracle as appellate decisionmaker was in its physical 
manifestation a statue of a deity (sometimes but not always a 
deceased and deified pharaoh) carried on a litter by several 
priests who interpreted the will of the god by moving the litter 
forward or backward in response to questions. Backward 
movement indicated “no,” and historians speculate that forward 
meant “yes.”17 Ancient sources also state that the deity “spoke,” 
likely when directional movement could not adequately render a 
judgment.18 Logic suggests that the god’s speech was uttered by 
the priests, who briefly became de facto appellate justices before 
returning to their priestly duties. 
Despite the evidence supporting a role for the oracle in the 
legal system, it bears noting that we have relatively little 
confirmation of the oracle’s status as an intermediate appellate 
forum. That conclusion is contingent on the accuracy of the 
theory of some Egyptologists that a final appeal could, under 
certain circumstances, be made to the reigning pharaoh 
himself.19 In other situations, the decision of the oracle was 
final.
C. Athens 
Aristotle credits Solon, the sixth century B.C.E. Athenian 
politician and poet, with giving the power of appeal to the 
popular law courts.20 Although there are varying interpretations 
among classicists as to the precise scope of the appellate system 
created by Solon, the most probable construction—indeed, the 
one supported by Plutarch’s writings—maintains that a litigant 
 15. Id. at 58–59 (indicating that the oracle was believed to be the manifestation of a 
deity, and its ruling a revelation of the deity’s will). 
16. Id. at 58. 
17. Id. at 59. 
18. Id.
 19. Id. at 88.
 20. MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 73 (1989).
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ANCIENT PRECEDENTS OF THE MODERN RIGHT TO APPEAL 15
dissatisfied with the judgment of a magistrate could appeal to 
the Eliaia, which was the assembly of Athenian citizens 
convened for judicial purposes (a “jury,” in the modern sense).21
The Eliaia heard the case de novo and had the power to affirm 
the magistrate’s judgment or reverse it and render a new 
judgment.22 The Athenian appeal was limited to correction of 
the magistrate’s judgment; the jury was the authoritative 
pinnacle of Athenian jurisprudence and its judgments could not 
be appealed. But by the fifth century B.C.E., magistrates no 
longer rendered judgments, and legal disputes originated in the 
Eliaia.23
D. Rome 
Classicists trisect Roman history into the monarchy, the 
republic, and the empire. Not until the empire—with 
implementation of a new legal procedure during the reign of the 
emperor Augustus—did the Roman legal system adopt a 
hierarchy of courts and an accompanying appellate system.24
Under that Roman appellate procedure, new evidence could be 
presented in what essentially was a rehearing before a superior 
court.25 Roman litigants were required to present oral or written 
notices of appeal to the courts whose judgment they sought to 
appeal.26 By the time Constantinople had become the center of 
the empire, appellate volume had grown so great that the 
emperor Justinian decreed that a judgment could not be appealed 
more than twice.27
 21. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 30–33 (1978); RUSS
VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 214–15 (2002).
22. See MACDOWELL, supra note 21, at 30. 
 23. VERSTEEG, supra note 21, at 214. 
 24. H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
OF ROMAN LAW 400, 400 n.8 (3d ed. 1972). But some appellate rights antedated the 
imperial hierarchy of courts, such as the right of a Roman citizen to appeal a death sentence 
rendered by a magistrate. See PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI’S TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN
LAW 5, 79–82 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that the appeal was “to the people,” and discussing 
system of cognitio, or “investigation,” which included appeal).  
25. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 24, at 444. 
26. Id. at 400. Under certain circumstances, the emperor himself occasionally heard 
appeals as an appellate court of final resort. See DU PLESSIS, supra note 24, at 81 (noting 
that emperors’ jurisdiction became more “clearly delineated” over time). 
27. DU PLESSIS, supra note 24, at 81. 
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II. ANCIENT APPELLATE LEGACY
A. The Appeal in America 
1. In the Beginning 
Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not 
seamlessly inherit its appellate system from England. In fact, 
English common law did not incorporate a formal appellate 
system until the nineteenth century.28 The institution and vitality 
of the appellate process in the American colonies may have been 
a direct result of the preexisting corporate structure of the New 
England trading companies, whose internal regulations featured 
a vertical appellate system of remedy.29 This culture of 
appeal30—itself impacted by European civil law, a form of 
which was practiced in England’s ecclesiastical courts31—may 
have in some geographic areas moved into the public sphere 
during the transition from company-administered land grants to 
colonies.32
 28. GREGORY DURSTON, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1500–
1750, at 627–28 (2004) (noting that “[h]istorically, common law lacked a mechanism 
allowing an already adjudicated case to be appealed to a higher tribunal” and that 
England’s “specialist Criminal Court of Appeal was only established in 1908,” and also 
pointing out that it remains “very difficult to go beyond a jury decision” in England today).
 29. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 
944–50 (1997).  
 30. The term “culture of appeal” suggests that “the specialized technical usage of the 
word [appeal] in legal spheres was inseparable from its more colloquial usage in the 
political sphere and that the term, ‘the appeal,’ also referred to a set of broader meanings 
and practices” during the early colonial period. Id. at 922. 
 31. Id. at 923. This culture of appeal traces back to imperial Roman legal procedure. 
Id.; see also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 147 (2007) (noting that, while the origins of modern European civil law lie in 
ancient Rome, a variety of German, French, and pan-European influences have impacted 
its formation over the centuries). In keeping with the tradition of continental civil law, 
English ecclesiastical courts possessed an advanced vertical appellate system long before 
one appeared in English common law. R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, 1500–1860 at 4 (2006) (noting that in the 
ecclesiastical courts, “[a]ppeals generally lay from lower to higher courts”). 
32. Bilder, supra note 29, at 944–50 (discussing colonial Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island).
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A      11/10/2016   09:41:10
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A      11/10/2016   09:41:10
POLANDEXECEDIT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016 6:24 PM
ANCIENT PRECEDENTS OF THE MODERN RIGHT TO APPEAL 17
Some American colonists possessed a right of appeal to the 
Privy Council in London by the late seventeenth century.33 And 
some of our oldest state supreme courts trace their histories back 
to colonial times.34
2. Under the Constitution 
The Constitution establishes the Supreme Court and grants 
Congress the power to create inferior courts, thus contemplating 
a judicial hierarchy,35 which Congress established in 1891 by 
creating intermediate appellate courts.36 Their successors, 
today’s federal courts of appeals, review questions of law de 
novo and review findings of fact for substantial evidence in jury 
trials and for clear error in bench trials.37
The Supreme Court exercises discretionary review.38 But a 
civil litigant dissatisfied with the ruling of a federal district court 
may either move for a new trial or move to vacate the judgment 
based upon newly discovered evidence, and a criminal 
defendant is given a similar opportunity.39 And of course a first 
 33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 16 (2005) (referring to 
the Massachusetts Charter of 1691).  
 34. See, e.g., The Supreme Court of Virginia, VA. JUDICIAL SYS. (Sept. 2010), http:// 
www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/scvinfoinfo.pdf.; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania—
Overview, UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS. OF PA. (2016), http://www.pacourts.us/learn?q=supreme; 
About the Supreme Judicial Court, MASS. CT. SYS. (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc 
/supreme-judicial-court.html. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that “[t]he judicial power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish”); U.S. CONST. art.  I § 8, cl. 9 (empowering Congress to 
“constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”). 
 36. See, e.g., Andrew T. Solomon, The Texas Supreme Court’s Petition System: A 
System in Need of Reexamination, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 696 n.2 (2012) (referring to 
Evarts Act). 
 37. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (providing that “the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility”); see Chen v. 
Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801–02 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing differences between treatment 
of administrative-law judge’s findings and findings by jury); Southex Exhibitions, Inc. v. 
R.I. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 279 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that “pure legal issues, 
such as statutory interpretations, are reviewed de novo,” and that factual findings are 
reviewed “only for clear error”). These standards of review trace to “the good old rule, that 
on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of 
the court to decide.” Ga. v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).  
38. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 36, at 696 n.2 (discussing discretionary review). 
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (“New Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment”); FED. R. CIV.
P. 60 (“Relief From a Judgment or Order”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (“New Trial”). 
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appeal to the relevant federal court of appeals is a matter of 
right.40
The Constitution does not mandate that states provide 
appellate review.41 While not compelled to implement appellate 
systems, every state has done so, and nearly every state offers 
access to its appellate system by right.42
B. Our Ancient Appellate Inheritance 
The organizing principle behind every appellate system in 
the United States is a vertical establishment of courts, with 
higher courts possessing express power to correct the errors of 
lower courts, and litigants in most states possessing a right to 
appeal.43 Interestingly, there is a chronological trend toward this 
modern appellate structure among the ancients, with a 
progression from new trials in horizontally situated 
Mesopotamian courts to vertical appeals in Rome. But this 
progression probably did not involve the intercultural 
transmission of early notions of appellate law from Near Eastern 
to European civilizations: The majority of academics agree that 
the creation of Greek and Roman law was endogenous to 
Europe; only a minority point to Near Eastern influence.44 The 
historical contribution and continuity of Rome’s appellate 
system, alone, are the ancient characteristics most readily 
verifiable in the modern appellate law of the United States. 
Three components of ancient appellate law, millennia later, 
are fundamental to our state and federal appellate systems: the 
new trial, the right to appeal, and the vertical hierarchy of 
appellate courts. Appellate systems of the ancient world appear 
 40. See supra notes 2 & 3.  
41. E.g., Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).  
 42. Dalton, supra note 1, at 62 n.2 (noting that only Virginia and West Virginia do not 
provide a right of appeal, but describing access to appellate courts available in those 
states).
43. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 36, at 695–96; Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative 
Analysis Of The Right To Appeal, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2011) (pointing 
out that primary purpose of appeal is correction of error); contra Dalton, supra note 1 
(indicating that Virginia and West Virginia are exceptions).  
44. See, e.g., GAGARIN, supra note 20, at 126–29 (advancing majority view); but see 
generally RAYMOND WESTBROOK, EX ORIENTE LEX: NEAR EASTERN INFLUENCES ON 
ANCIENT GREEK & ROMAN LAW (Deborah Lyons & Kurt Raaflaub eds., 2015) (advancing 
minority view).  
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ANCIENT PRECEDENTS OF THE MODERN RIGHT TO APPEAL 19
to have originated as an equitable response to the post-trial 
discovery of new evidence and the occurrence of error in the 
application of law or in the findings of fact. These ancient 
appellate systems first implemented horizontal new trials to 
account for new evidence or error, and this implementation later 
transitioned to a more sophisticated system of vertical appeal. 
Thus, the ancients could obtain new trials if new evidence 
emerged or if the original court materially erred;45 these 
precedents endure.46 Indeed, a motion for new trial still precedes 
and complements vertical appeal, a noteworthy procedural 
integration of this ancient inheritance into a modern system.47
Origin of the right of appeal lies in the ancient world.48
Much as in the modern era, ancient litigants generally had a 
right to intermediate appeal, but further appeal was 
discretionary. Of course, the discretion of final appeal in the 
ancient world ultimately resided with pharaoh or emperor, not a 
federal or state court of last resort. 
Among the ancient legal systems, Rome’s appellate system 
most resembles our own. This resemblance not only is 
evidenced in vertical appellate hierarchy and the staffing of 
appellate courts with judges rather than jurors or priests, but also 
in functional procedure such as the Roman notice of appeal.49
But the Athenian appellate system also cannot be overlooked; 
vertical appeal to an appellate assembly of jurors satisfies the 
modern definition of appeal, and may have been an intellectual 
antecedent for Rome’s more developed system of vertical 
appeals. 
Sources available to reconstruct ancient appellate law are 
scant, short, and fittingly delphic. Notwithstanding their 
evidentiary shortcomings, they offer sufficient substance to 
support an analysis that goes beyond the frequently encountered 
generalization that appellate law originated in the ancient world. 
Even with our limited access to the laws and legal records of the 
 45. See, e.g., VERSTEEG, supra note 7, at 58 (Mesopotamia); Theodorides, supra note 
11, at 310 (Egypt). 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (addressing new trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (same).  
 47. A timely motion for new trial extends the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v).  
48. See, e.g., VERSTEEG, supra note 12, at 89; VERSTEEG, supra note 21, at 214. 
49. JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 24, at 400. 
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world’s oldest civilizations, we can trace the origins of appellate 
law and practice. Their antiquity and continuing development 
suggest in humanity an immemorial awareness of the fallibility 
of human judgment, a yearning for the infallible judgment of 
divinity, and—lacking this divine judgment—the desire to 
implement a procedure to remedy our human error. 
